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This paper argues that the banking crises in the United States in the early 1930s were similar
to the "twin crises" -- banking and balance of payments crises -- which have occurred in developing
countries in recent years. The downturn that began in 1929 undermined banks that had made risky
loans in the twenties. The deflation that followed further weakened the banks, especially in rural
areas where the deflation in prices and incomes was the greatest. Depositors in those areas began
transferring their deposits to banks they regarded as safer, or purchasing bonds. These "silent runs,"
essentially a capital flight, have been neglected in many accounts of the banking crises. But evidence
from the Gold Settlement Fund (which recorded interregional gold movements) and from regional
deposit movements suggests that silent runs were important, especially in the crucial year 1930.
When the crisis worsened, state and local authorities began declaring "bank holidays," which limited
the right of depositors to make withdrawals, a movement that culminated in the declaration of a












Deflation, Silent Runs, and Bank Holidays, in the Great Contraction
1 
 
1.  Separate Regions with Separate Banking Systems 
 
The Great Contraction of 1929 to 1939, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
designated it, must surely be the most carefully studied episode in American monetary 
history. Their work, and that of Charles Kindleberger (1973), Peter Temin (1976, 1989), 
Barry Eichengreen (1995), and many other scholars focusing on particular aspects of the 
contraction, has done much to clarify the causes and consequences of the collapse, and to 
clarify the policy mistakes made by the Federal Reserve System. Nevertheless, the flood of 
books and papers on monetary problems during the Depression shows no signs of abating, 
suggesting that we have not yet reached the point where we believe that existing 
explanations are entirely sufficient.  
This is especially the case when we turn to the causes of the collapse of the banking 
system. Important advances have been made in determining the role of panic as opposed to 
fundamentals. Yet there is perhaps still room for an attempt to provide a narrative 
framework for understanding the crisis. Here I will argue that the banking crises of the early 
1930s were similar to the “twin crises” – banking and balance of payments crises – that have 
occurred in developing countries in recent years. The rural regions of the United States were 
like the developing countries today: dependent on the export of a few commodities in which 
they had a comparative advantage, and with independent, and relatively weak banking 
systems. Declining demand and export prices after 1929 weakened the banking systems in 
rural regions because they raised doubts about the ability of bank borrowers to repay their 
loans, and led to balance of payments deficits. Since the banks in rural regions were linked 





natural desire, moreover, on the part of people who had deposits in rural banks to move their 
funds to stronger banks in the financial centers, a capital flight. The interregional movement 
of funds further weakened the banking system in the regions experiencing the "external" 
drain. Eventually, as bank failure rates rose, runs developed. In the end, governments 
intervened by imposing restrictions on withdrawals.
2 
To be sure, the analogy between the “twin crises” in developing countries and the 
banking crises of the 1930s can be taken only so far. The crises in developing regions today 
have involved elements, such as short term capital flows and currency mismatches that we 
do not find among regions of the United States in the 1930s. Most developing countries, 
moreover, can devalue their currencies relative to others. This option was not open to 
regions within the United States. Minnesota dollars were not going to be reduced to .75 in 
New York dollars. Nevertheless, the analogy with the twin crises of recent years, I believe, 
helps provide a vocabulary for understanding the banking crises in the early 1930s.  This 
paper, in other words, examines the banking crises from a regional perspective. It attempts 
to demonstrate that there were important forces at work that have been somewhat neglected 
because they do not show up clearly when the problem is viewed from a purely macro-
economic or purely micro-economic perspective.
3  
Although regional aspects of the Depression have been neglected in recent 
discussions of the monetary side of the contraction, with the important exception of Wicker 
(1996), regional differences were important to people at the time for a number of good 
reasons. (1) During the 1930s there were important cultural barriers to the mobility of labor. 
African Americans faced enormous racial discrimination wherever they went, and even 





shown, while the labor markets of Birmingham England and Pittsburgh Pennsylvania were 
integrated, those of Birmingham Alabama and Pittsburgh Pennsylvania were not. (2) Banks 
were not permitted to branch across state lines, and often were prohibited from branching 
within states. Many banks in rural areas, therefore, had most of their resources tied up in 
assets that depended on the price of a single agricultural product. (3) Federal programs that 
transfer income from regions that are doing well to regions that are not, such as agricultural 
price support programs, did not exist on a modern scale when the depression began. (4) 
Monetary-policy was influenced strongly by the individual Governors of the Federal 
Reserve Banks. By design the District Banks represented the interests of separate regions, 
and were given far more power to adopt independent policy actions than is the case today. 
This was changing. Indeed, soon after the Federal Reserve was established it was recognized 
that open market purchases had to be coordinated by a system-wide committee because the 
interests of a particular district (to avoid the drain of reserves to central money markets 
produced by a purchase of securities) might differ from the interests of the system as a 
whole. But the tendency of governors from predominantly rural districts to see a conflict 
between what was good for their district and what was good for the eastern money markets 
persisted. 
The experience of the United States during the early 1930s is unlikely to be repeated 
in detail. Nevertheless, it does throw into sharp relief some of the problems that face a 
monetary authority that must find the right path for a group of diverse regions when things 
go bad. Certain rural regions of the United States were hit especially hard by the downturn 
of 1929 because the prices of food, fibers, and minerals fell especially rapidly. The banking 





deposits because their rudimentary banking systems were linked by a common currency to 
powerful financial centers. Had policymakers been alert to the signs of interregional capital 
flight, they might have intervened successfully. Instead, the banking crisis was allowed to 
fester. Hopefully, this paper then may be of some relevance to the current debate over 
whether to extend existing monetary unions, and possibly to future debates about how to 
conduct monetary policy within a monetary union.  
 
2.  The Role of Deflation 
 
The cyclical downturn that began in late 1929 (August, according to the NBER 
chronology) ushered in a strong downward trend in prices and income: The NNP deflator 
fell 4.6 percent between 1929 and 1930, and nominal NNP fell 16.1.
4  The deflation, of 
course, was far from uniform. The prices of some of the major agricultural products dropped 
steeply in real terms.
5 This is shown in Table 1, which reports the real prices of some of the 
important agricultural products, real net farm income, and the real value of mineral products, 
starting in 1925 when the real prices of a number of these crops and real net farm income 
reached their postwar peaks. The real price of wheat experienced the most dramatic decline. 
It fell steadily year after year until by 1932 it had lost 60 percent of its 1925 value. The other 
series show a rebound in the late 1920s. So real net farm income reached another peak in 
1929, although at a lower level than in 1925. Between 1929 and 1930, however, all of the 
key farm prices dropped in real terms, and real net farm income declined about 29 percent. 
Between 1929 and 1932 real farm income declined about 60 percent. Such a decline was 
bound to have enormous consequences for regions that were highly specialized in the 
production of basic agricultural products, and for banks in those regions because it raised 





The impact of these movements in real prices can be seen in the regional terms of 
trade shown in Table 2. The West North Central, a wheat-growing region, and the West 
South Central, a cotton-growing region, were hard hit. Perhaps somewhat more surprising 
are the substantial declines in the terms of trade of the Pacific and Mountain regions. The 
fall in mineral prices may be the explanation here. The price of silver fell from $.53 per fine 
oz. in 1929 to $.28 in 1932, a fall of 64 percent in nominal terms, and 38 percent in real 
terms (using the GNP deflator).
6 The price of lead fell from about $.068 per pound in 1929 
to  $.032 in 1932, a fall of 76 percent in nominal terms, and 50 percent in real terms.  The 
price of copper fell from  $.184 per pound in 1929 to  $.058 in 1932 a staggering fall of 115 
percent in nominal terms, and 89 percent in real terms. There are, however, some surprises 
in the table. The South Atlantic region, for example, actually experienced an improvement 
in its terms of trade. 
What caused the relative price shocks of the early 1930s? A boom-and-bust cycle 
associated with World War I is one candidate. The war added greatly to the demand for 
these basic commodities while destroying productive capacity in Europe. Farmers and 
businessmen in neutral countries, such as the United States, went into debt in order to 
expand capacity. Later demand declined to more normal levels, and supply expanded as 
European producers came back on line. The result was a decline in commodity prices that 
became a rout in the early 1930s. Barry Eichengreen’s (2002) argument that the monetary 
shock was worldwide provides a second candidate: if the world shock was greater initially 
than the U.S. shock it would explain why the prices of internationally traded goods fell 
faster and farther than the prices of domestically traded goods. But to explain the origins of 





chapter 4, 83-107) provides a detailed commodity-by-commodity account going back to 
World War I. For our purposes it is sufficient to take these shocks as given.  
How did the deterioration in the terms of trade and the contraction in income affect 
the stability of the banking system? Table 3 summarizes some information. The first column 
of data shows the cumulated amount of suspended bank deposits as a percentage of 1929 
deposits. In other words, the figure for New England shows total suspended deposits from 
1930 through 1933 as a percentage of total deposits in all commercial banks in the region in 
1929. This column illustrates the wide regional differences in the experience of the crisis. 
Evidently, the regions containing the eastern financial centers  (New England and Middle 
Atlantic) along with the Pacific Coast suffered the least damage.  
The second column of data shows the percentage change in the terms of trade of 
each region – “the prices of goods sold by census divisions to other parts of the United 
States” divided by "the prices of goods bought by census divisions from other parts of the 
United States" – based on Warren Waite’s (1942) estimates. This column shows that 
movements in interregional terms of trade were dramatic, but not always in the same 
direction as suspended deposits.
7 In fact, the simple correlation between changes in the 
terms of trade and the amount of suspended deposits, shown in the last row of the column, 
goes the “wrong” way. 
8 
The change in total personal income, shown in column 3, goes directly to the 
question of how much income borrowers had with which to repay loans. This variable is 
correlated in the right direction with the amount of suspended deposits. The correlation, 
however, is far from perfect. The simple correlation between suspended deposits and 





four years, for example, the South Atlantic region experienced the smallest fall in personal 
income, “only” 44.97 percent, but it experienced the second highest level of bank 
suspensions, 20.91 percent. The institutional advantage of containing the large money center 
banks evidently could offset, in some measure, the disadvantage of a large decline in 
personal income.  
There were precedents for the deflation of the early 1930s. Prices and real incomes, 
including farm prices and real incomes, fell dramatically in the 1890s and after World War 
I. The deflation of the 1890s was associated with banking crises, particularly the crisis of 
1893. The depression associated with the deflation and banking crises of the 1890s was 
severe in terms of output and employment, although as Neal et al. (this volume) point out 
the deflation and banking crises may have produced reforms in the financial system that set 
the stage for more rapid economic growth. The post World War I deflation, on the other 
hand, did not produce anything like the crack-ups in the 1890s and early 1930s. One 
difference may be that rural regions were coming off of a long period of prosperity, and so 
the rural banking problems and capital flight we observe in the early 1930s did not emerge 
following World War I. 
 
3. Silent Runs and Noisy Runs 
There has been a tendency in the literature to focus on what might be called “noisy 
runs.” Depositors literally run down to the bank, stand in line with their scared fellow 
depositors, and withdraw cash, perhaps forcing the bank to close its doors. Equally 
damaging to banks, and to the economy in a particular region, was a “silent run.” Depositors 





consider stronger. Noisy runs lead naturally to a decline in the deposit currency ratio. This is 
one reason why Friedman and Schwartz, and subsequent authors, tended to focus on the 
deposit currency ratio as an indicator of distrust of the banking system.
9 A silent run, by way 
of contrast, need not produce any change in the aggregate deposit-currency ratio. As I will 
try to show below silent runs of substantial magnitude seem to have preceded the noisy runs 
of the early 1930s. Silent runs are familiar from more recent banking crises, such as the 
savings and loan crisis, but their role in the Great Contraction has been neglected compared 
with the attention paid to noisy runs. 
A silent run could be intraregional (the transfer of deposits from a small local bank 
to a bigger bank in a nearby city) or interregional (the transfer of deposits from a small bank 
in the interior of the country to a large bank in the Eastern financial centers.) Both drains 
create a liquidity problem for the bank losing deposits, and both types of run were important 
during the contraction. Here, however, I will focus on the interregional runs. First, 
interregional runs probably created more economic distress in the region losing funds. 
Borrowers, for example, may have been able to follow depositors when the run was intra-
regional, but not when it was interregional. Second, monetary policy during the contraction 
was controlled by the Governors of the Federal Reserve Banks. And finally, focusing on the 
interregional runs may provide some useful examples for current debates about dollarization 
and monetary unions. 
There has been a good deal of attention paid in the literature to whether bank runs 
were sometimes the result of a “contagion of fear,” that is a panic, or whether they always 
resulted from rational concerns about the solvency of banks. The latest research by 





suggests that a “contagion of fear” may not have been very prominent -- that the weakest 
banks experienced the most intense runs. A silent interregional run, almost by definition, is 
up to a point at least, a measured and rational response to concerns about the solvency of the 
banking system, and therefore also inconsistent with a "contagion of fear." It could be that 
fundamentals were misjudged, although given the subsequent course of events this would be 
a hard position to defend. And it could be that the people making the decision to move 
deposits were taking their clue from other people they regarded as informed and prudent, 
rather than looking themselves at fundamentals. Still, a run based on these considerations 
would be better described as a “demonstration effect,” than as a contagion of fear.  
At times the term panic is used to refer not so much to the behavior of individuals as 
to the behavior of the group. One can imagine events in which the behavior of each 
individual separately is rational even though the behavior of the group as a whole is self-
destructive. Someone yells fire in a crowded auditorium. Each individual separately takes 
the rational action of running straight for the exit. No one is running around in a random 
fashion. But the aggregate effect is to create a dangerous congestion at the exit. If people 
were disciplined and filed out in order, more lives could be saved. Perhaps this definition of 
a panic applies to the runs of the early 1930s. The decision to remove deposits from rural 
areas in the face of a sharp downturn in real agricultural prices and incomes may have been 
prudent from the point of view of each depositor taken separately, but the aggregate effect 
was to undermine the banking system in those regions.  
To get a sense of the magnitude of silent interregional runs we can turn to the Gold 
Settlement Fund. The Fund (its name was changed to the Interdistrict Settlement Fund after 





of funds among Federal Reserve districts. If a check was drawn on a bank in San Francisco 
and deposited in New York, the Gold Settlement Account would record the increase in the 
assets of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the decrease in the assets of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. The accounts also showed, on separate lines, the 
effects of federal government transfers and external gold flows.  
The accounts of the Gold Settlement Fund do not provide a complete record of 
interdistrict movements of funds because some interregional transactions might have been 
completed by shipping gold or cleared through private clearing arrangements. Although the 
Federal Reserve had hoped that its clearing facilities would quickly supplant private 
clearinghouses and correspondent relationships, private arrangements remained important in 
the 1920s and 1930s. In 1929, for example, clearings through private clearinghouses were 
nearly double clearings through the Federal Reserve System. (White 1983, 108-110). Many 
of the private clearings through clearinghouses, however, must have involved local 
transactions. In the long run, moreover, transactions that produced sustained increases or 
decreases in correspondent balances would probably give rise, as Hartland (1949, 396) 
contended to clearings through the Gold Settlement Fund. So it is safe to assume that the 
Fund provides a clear picture of the direction that private funds were moving, at least for the 
period we are examining. It should also be kept in mind that changes in the Gold Settlement 
Fund do not correspond directly to changes in bank reserves because other variables, such as 
bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve, will affect bank reserves.  
Figure 1 shows a summary measure of the extent of interregional gold flows from 
1926 to 1937: the sum of all regional gold outflows (equal to the sum of gold inflows from 





Fund. For example, if Minnesota and other rural districts lost $10 in gold (while New York 
and other eastern districts gained $10) and if there was on average $100 in the gold 
settlement fund, the figure plotted would be 10%. In other words, 10% of the gold stock had 
moved from one region to another during the year.  
It is clear from the figure that there were extraordinary interregional movements of 
gold during the Great Contraction. There was little change in the denominator during the 
early years of the Depression so the spike is largely due to interregional gold flows. The 
picture in the post 1934 figure is complicated by the influx of European gold. The low level 
of the ratio in these years compared with those immediately proceeding reflects an increase 
in the denominator.
10 
How could these gold movements exceed the amount in the Fund, as they did from 
1930 to 1932?  It would seem, at first thought that the highest this ratio could go would be to 
one. Suppose that initially all the gold was held by one group of Banks designated A, while 
group B held none. If no new gold was deposited in the fund and all the gold held by A was 
transferred during the year to B, the ratio would be one. To put the question differently, why 
didn’t some districts simply run out of gold? One offset was the deposit of new gold in the 
fund from inflows of foreign gold, and domestic gold mining, which was revived in early 
1930s.
11 In addition, the Federal Reserve, may have exercised its authority to simply 
reallocate part of the Fund to Reserve Banks that were exhausting their accounts. The 
accounting justification was that district banks losing gold had their “participation” in the 
ownership of Federal Reserve Assets increased. The Fund, in other words, could act as 






Figure 1 distinguishes between interregional gold flows resulting from private 
transactions and net gold flows, the sum of private and Federal government transactions. 
Clearly, net gold flows were always less than private gold flows. This means that, in 
general, gold flows produced by Federal government transactions tended to offset private 
gold flows and preserve the internal balance of payments. I had expected to find this result 
only during the later years of the Depression. New Deal programs such as agricultural price 
supports that produced transfers to rural areas became important after 1933. The data shows, 
however, that interregional Federal transfers helped to preserve the internal monetary union 
even in the period 1930 to 1932; Federal transfers were simply insufficient to offset the 
other forces undermining the banking system.
13 
What was causing these interregional gold flows? I believe that in large part they 
reflected the transfer of funds from banks in the interior to banks in the traditional financial 
centers, most importantly New York, but also Boston and Philadelphia, by deposit holders 
seeking greater safety for their funds. In some cases, the flow might have been the result of 
someone writing a check on a bank in one region and depositing it in a bank in another 
region. In other cases, the flow might have been the result of someone writing a check in 
order to purchase a security owned in another region. In either case, the transfers could be 
termed a silent run, or to use a term more familiar from discussions of international crises, a 
capital flight.  
Some additional evidence is provided in Figure 2, which shows the flow of gold into 
the Eastern Financial Centers (the all important New York District, Boston, and 
Philadelphia) from 1926 to 1933. Figure 2 throws the influx of funds in 1930, 1931, and 





terms of trade. If rural regions had to pay only slightly less for their imports, but got 
substantially less for their exports, they would, other things equal, run a balance of payments 
deficit. Figure 2 therefore shows the terms of trade between the Eastern Financial Centers 
and the rest of the country as an index, to be read against the right-hand axis, with 1926 
=100.
 14  The eastern terms of trade did improve somewhat during 1930 and 1931, and that 
might account for some of the inflow, although there is a sharp drop in 1932, while gold 
continued to flow in. Figure 2 also shows total personal income in the Eastern financial 
centers relative to total personal income in the remainder of the country, beginning in 1929 
when the figures become available.
15  This is also an index (1929=100) to be read against 
the right-hand side. Eastern incomes it turns out rose steadily relative to those in the rest of 
the country during 1930-1932. Other things equal, the relative strength of income in the East 
would have drained funds from the East, because eastern exports would fall more than 
imports. So this factor was working in the direction opposite to the dominant flows and 
cannot explain them.  
The effect of these movements, along with other factors such as the lending by 
Federal Reserve district banks to their members, can be seen in figure 3, which shows the 
growth of deposits by district between June 1929 and June 1930.
16 The dates here are 
important. The Gold settlement fund data shows end of year figures, and things were to 
deteriorate substantially between June and December 1930. Evidently, the experience varied 
dramatically from district to district during the first year of the contraction.
17 Some had 
experienced substantial contraction; others had experienced substantial growth. New York, 
in particular had experienced a 15% gain in deposits. The districts have been arranged by 





illustrates the tendency of deposits to move from the smaller, and therefore weaker, banking 
systems to larger, and therefore stronger, systems. 
Figure 4 shows the following year, the change in deposits by region from June 1930 
to June 1931. The picture is now very different. What had been a retreat in some regions and 
an advance in others had become a general rout. Only San Francisco and Philadelphia were 
able to keep their heads above water. In most cases, the decline in deposits was due to both a 
decrease in reserves and to a fall in the deposit-currency ratio. New York, however, was an 
exception. It experienced a small increase in reserves. 
We can also see the redistribution of funds if we look simply at the balance sheets of 
the four largest New York National Banks – First, National City, Chase, and Public. End-of- 
year values for deposits, loans, and reserves of the Big Four are shown in Figure 5. All three 
categories were higher at the end of 1930 than at the end of 1929. The gains started in the 
late 1920s and were probably produced during that period by the boom in the stock market 
rather than banking difficulties in the interior. This may mean that there was an organic link 
between the stock market boom and the deterioration of the condition of the banks in the 
interior. 
Who was moving their funds? It seems unlikely to me that individual depositors 
contributed very much to the interregional capital flight of the early 1930s by directly 
moving funds from one bank to another. Individuals might move their funds to a larger bank 
in the same city, or divide their funds among several banks, or purchase financial assets, or 
withdraw cash. They were unlikely, one would think, to move their funds to a bank in 
another district. It seems more likely that when funds were moved directly to a bank in a 





chief financial officer of a nationwide corporation to move the working funds at a small 
local bank to a larger bank in a financial center, especially if that is where the corporate 
headquarters were located. It is possible that some of the funds in flight were bank funds. A 
bank that had traditionally divided the funds it held in other banks between regional centers 
and the Eastern financial centers might have shifted more of its funds to the latter as local 
conditions worsened.  
Individuals would be involved, however, when the interregional transfer resulted 
from the purchase of financial assets on the stock exchange. The purchase of a government 
bond, for example, might lead to the removal of funds from a bank in the interior by the 
individual purchasing the bond, and their redeposit in a bank in the east by the person selling 
the bond. World War I, by creating a large widely held public debt, and by creating 
familiarity with the government bond market, may have contributed to the development of 
this channel for disintermediation and capital flight. 
Although the capital flight has not received much attention in recent years, a number 
of careful observers noted it at the time. (1) E. A. Goldenweiser was the director of the 
Division of Research and Statistics of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System during the contraction. In his retrospective assessment of the period Goldenweiser 
(1951, 164) cites two factors to explain the tide of bank failures: (1) "commodity price 
declines and shrinkage of real-estate values" and (2) "lack of confidence in the solvency of 
banks [that] resulted in large-scale withdrawals of deposits and in transfers of funds from 
smaller to larger banks, particularly to banks in reserve and central reserve cities." While 





crisis (and so to make the case for the advice that he gave at the time?) there is no reason to 
think that his account of the causes of the crisis was biased.   
(2) James W. Angell was one of the leading monetary economists of the day and an 
original member of Roosevelt’s Brain trust. In one study he (1969 [1936], 66-68) examined 
regional deposit data. There he noted the rise in New York and Philadelphia’s shares of total 
deposits and attributed the increases to “interior funds seeking safety after 1929.” 
(3) Fred L. Garlock was an economist with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of 
the Department of Agriculture. He conducted detailed studies of country banks in Arkansas 
(Garlock and Gile, 1935) and Wisconsin (Garlock 1941) that included interviews with bank 
officials as well as more conventional examinations of bank balance sheets and income 
statements. In his study of Wisconsin banks he noted  (1941, 10) that there had been “a 
general movement of funds from agricultural areas to the large financial and industrial areas 
during the early 1930s.” And he attributed this to an adverse balance of payments, and in 
1932, although not before, to withdrawals for “hoarding or for transfer to other points where 
it was felt the funds would be more secure.” 
(4) Calvin Hoover and B.U. Ratchford (1951, 171) claimed that large insurance and 
railroad companies transferred working balances from small local banks in the South to 
larger, safer banks nearer their home offices.  
More recently, Elmus Wicker (1996, 102) describes the problem under the term 
“seepage.” He notes:  “Data on bank deposits show a general movement of funds from 
agricultural to financial and industrial centers during the Great Depression.” As evidence he 
offers the decline in the ratio of nonmember bank total deposits to total deposits of all 





member banks to total deposits of all commercial banks. One advantage of the Gold 
Settlement Fund data is that rather than simply showing the ratio of deposits in two different 
kinds of banks, or two different areas, it shows dollars that we know were actually 
transferred from one region to another. 
All in all, the evidence, although admittedly sketchy, suggests that we are dealing 
with a substantial drain of gold from the interior motivated by the search for deposit safety. 
From the point of view of the banks and regions losing the gold, of course, the liquidity 
problems are the same whether the loss was due to a capital flight or to a balance of trade 
deficit. 
A capital flight to the East is the opposite of the traditional picture of drain on the 
East produced by banks in the South and West drawing on Eastern correspondents, the 
picture made famous by Sprague (1968 [1910]) in his classic history of bank failures under 
the National Banking Act. It would be surprising if we could not find individual examples of 
banks in the interior that were under pressure from depositors liquidating deposits held in 
eastern banks during 1929 to 1932. So again the eastern movement of funds remains hard to 
explain in the absence of a capital flight. Perhaps what had changed from an earlier day, was 
the growth of national corporations with the ability to move funds from one region to 
another, and growth of widespread holdings of government bonds that could be liquidated 
(on eastern markets) in an emergency, a point I will return to below. 
How significant were these flows for the system as a whole? One metric is bank 
reserves. In 1929 bank reserves outside New York totaled $1.405 billion. The net flow of 
gold toward New York averaged about 36 percent of this amount. Partly these private flows 





taxes were collected in the eastern financial centers than were spent there. Partly also these 
flows were offset by loans extended by the various Federal Reserve banks. Nevertheless, the 
net flow of gold must have placed a severe burden on banks in other regions, and helped 
intensify the crisis. 
To clinch the argument that silent runs undermined the banking systems in the 
interior regions and contributed to the banking crises it would be necessary to show in detail 
how losses of deposits due to interregional transfers affected individual banks. And this I 
must confess, I have not done. That real harm was done is, I would argue, plausible. The 
story would be, essentially, the usual textbook story of a multiple contraction of loans and 
deposits. Borrowers who could not renew loans or borrow working capital would be forced 
to default, undermining the solvency of their lender, and creating deterioration in local 
economic conditions that would undermine other banks. But I have no ground level 
examples of banks that actually experienced this sequence of events. It is possible, as a 
matter of arithmetic, that the banks that lost reserves due to the interregional capital flows 
were the ones that survived the crisis.  
A natural question to ask, for someone seeking confirmation that the capital flight 
mattered, is whether the interregional gold flows produced liquidity effects on interest rates. 
In other words, did rates rise in regions losing gold relative to regions gaining gold? The 
answer, it must be admitted, is no. Gene Smiley (1981) and Howard Bodenhorn (1995) 
estimated bank loan rates by region, and their series do not reveal distinct liquidity effects 
from the gold flows in the first half of 1930. On a regional level, this is the same finding -- 
declining interest rates in the face of a declining stock of money -- that was at the center of 





Evidently, the demand for loans was declining rapidly, even as losses of deposits deprived 
banks of the ability to make them. Real rates, of course, were rising rapidly. For example, 
the nominal loan rate for country national banks in the West North Central region, a wheat-
growing region, was 7.58 percent in 1929 and 7.04 percent in 1930. No evidence here of a 
liquidity effect.
18  But the "wheat rate of interest" was 3.65 percent in 1929 and 51.96 
percent in 1930!
19  
To form a complete picture of the banking crisis one must move from the silent runs 
to the noisy runs, and the bank failures. This part of the story, however, has been well-told 
elsewhere, most recently, and most thoroughly by Wicker (1996). The first banking crisis, 
according to Wicker, was associated with the failure of a chain of banks, the Caldwell 
banks, headquartered in St. Louis. The St. Louis district was hit hard by the deflation and the 
collapse of agricultural incomes. But the high rate of failure in this region was also due to 
factors specific to the Caldwell banks, and it would not do to exaggerate the correlation that 
existed at this stage in the crisis between specific events and the deflation. While the St. 
Louis district experience a momentous decline in personal income between 1929 and 1930, 
other districts such as Dallas experienced a similar decline, but did not suffer to the same 
extent in the first noisy crisis. The right metaphor might be a cloth stretched to the breaking 
point. All of the cloth is under pressure, but where the first tear occurs will depend on 
particular structural weaknesses. 
Wicker details the growing crisis, but the exact roles played by deflation, declining 
income, bank insolvency, fear itself, and so on are in doubt. Wicker, for example, suggests 
that Britain’s departure from gold in September 1931 might have undermined confidence in 





analog of the interregional drains highlighted here. But in the nature of things he is unable to 
uncover evidence of a direct link between that event and the particular failures that followed 
in the United States on the heels of the British decision. Although there was some 
improvement in 1932 over 1931, bank failures and deposits in failed banks remained at very 
high levels, and the supply of money and bank credit contracted dramatically.  
 
   
4. The Banking Holidays 
 
  Inevitably, governments intervene when financial crises become sufficiently severe. 
On the international scene intervention may take various forms: central banks may act as 
lenders of last resort, currency pegs may be abandoned, and capital controls may be 
imposed. In the early 1930s local and state government intervened by declaring “bank 
holidays.” During the holidays depositors were prevented from making withdrawals from 
banks, or the amount that they could withdraw at one time was limited in some fashion, say 
to five percent of the account per month.
20 There were several rationales. In most cases the 
banks were suffering heavy withdrawals. The goal was to protect the remaining assets while 
loans were arranged from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, or 
private lenders. In many cases, state and local officials also felt pressured into declaring 
holidays because holidays had already been declared in neighboring states. If depositors 
couldn’t get cash in one state they might turn to banks in neighboring states. Our earlier 
discussion of silent runs suggests that this was a reasonable fear. There was probably also 
the hope that a “cooling off” period would allow the banks to reopen without suffering 





  The rash of bank holidays was clearly a sign of how bad things had got.  Whether 
the holidays made things better or worse is a more difficult question.  When we discuss a 
more conventional bank panic we note that an action that is separately sensible – get your 
money out of a weak bank – leads to actions that in the aggregate undermine the system. 
The same was true with the bank holidays. Actions that were rational in a given state had an 
external effect and led to a rash of holidays, accurately labeled a panic, which undermined 
the payments system in the aggregate.  
  Table 3 chronicles the state and local bank holidays. I do not make any claim that 
this list is complete. I put it together mainly from a perusal of the New York Times and the 
Financial Chronicle simply to enable one to get a sense of the timing and regional diffusion 
of the crisis. It is clear from the table that the holidays began in the regions that had lost 
reserves earlier because of price and confidence shocks. The first signs were municipal 
holidays declared in the upper Midwest. On November 1 came the first statewide 
moratorium in Nevada, and on February 12, a one-day holiday in Louisiana.
21 The final 
dissolution of the banking system was ushered in by the holiday declared in Michigan in 
mid-February. Most of the larger Michigan banks belonged to one of two holding 
companies. The smaller, the Guardian Detroit Union Group, was teetering on the edge of 
bankruptcy. A desperate effort was launched to save this group through a Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation loan combined with aid from the Ford interests. But the plan foundered 
on demands that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation hold adequate collateral for its 
loan and the unwillingness of Henry Ford to take part, Ballantine (1948).
22   
  The final spurt of holidays was caused, in part, by the fear in some states that 





dared to keep their banks open. Governor Ruby Laffoon of Kentucky, obviously a politician 
of some imagination, spoke for many when he declared a bank holiday on March 1, 1933. 
His proclamation, given below, also describes the nature of the restrictions typically 
imposed.  
  Whereas many banks in the cities and towns contiguous to the borders of the 
State of Kentucky are closed or are only permitting limited withdrawals of 
their deposits. 
 
  Whereas, a result of this situation will be that the funds of the banks of 
Kentucky will be withdrawn to supply the needs of these other communities, 
thus weakening the resources of the people of the Commonwealth, and, 
 
  Whereas legal holidays may only be declared in the State of Kentucky by the 
Governor appointing certain days as days of thanksgiving. 
 
  Now, therefore in consideration of the nation-wide banking situation and in 
view of the fact that the people of the State of Kentucky, though suffering 
from the general depression, may perhaps in comparison with the people of 
other states have reason for thanksgiving. 
 
  I as Governor of the State of Kentucky, appoint the days of March 1, 2, 3 
and 4 1933, as days of thanksgiving in the State of Kentucky and declare 
such days legal holidays and do further provide as follows:  
 
  (1) That during said holidays all banks and trust companies shall be closed in 
the State of Kentucky for the regular transaction of business except. 
 
  (a) Said banks and trust companies may during the ordinary business hours 
of said holiday pay to their depositors  (whether time or demand) not 
exceeding an aggregate of 5 % of the respective deposits of such depositors 
at close of business on Feb. 28, 1933, provided that such payments shall only 
be made on checks, drafts or receipts dated subsequent to Feb. 28, 1933. 
 
  (b) During the banking hours of the last three days of the holiday period, said 
banks and trust companies may accept new deposits but such deposits shall 
be held in trust funds and may be insofar as they are represented by deposits 
of cash, withdrawn in full during said period. 
 
  (c) During said holiday period, said banks and trust companies, may transact 
any and all other business which does not involve the paying out of 
deposited funds other than herein authorized.... (Commercial and Financial 






  It is obvious from table 3 that by late February or early March 1933 a large fraction 
of deposits had been restricted by official actions and a good portion of the remainder had 
been restricted in some measure by individual bank actions. Table 4, makes this point in a 
different way by showing a snapshot of the banking system on the eve of President 
Roosevelt's announcement of the national banking holiday: virtually all deposits in the 
country were subject in some measure to restriction.  
  The rapid diffusion of the bank holidays also raises the question of whether it would 
be correct to speak of a bank-holiday “panic” or a “contagion of fear.” Again, much depends 
on how we define these terms. If what we mean by panic is simply foolish unreasoning 
behavior, then this was not the case. Governor Laffoon, at least, was clearly nobody’s fool. 
His concern, that banks in Kentucky would be drained of gold if they remained open while 
other systems closed, was reasonable in the circumstances, although whether this drain 
would actually have happened is hard to say. On the other hand, if what we mean by panic is 
a situation in which people are making rational decisions that create negative externalities, 
and that could be channeled into a more socially responsible direction by alternative 
institutional arrangements, then it is reasonable to speak of a bank-holiday panic. If governor 
Laffoon and the other politicians declaring holidays could have been dissuaded from issuing 
these proclamations by promises of lender of last resort loans to the banks in their 
jurisdiction from the Federal Reserve, the ultimate breakdown of the payments mechanism 
might have been avoided. The chain leading from deflation to silent runs to noisy runs to 
bank holidays might have been interrupted by the Federal Reserve at many points. Early on 





hard to recognize, but surely when bank holidays erupted the case for vigorous action was 
clear. 
  Barry Wigmore (1987) suggests that the final denouement, the national bank 
holiday, was also due to the fear that President Roosevelt would take the United States off 
the gold standard. This fear, according to Wigmore, produced an external gold drain, which 
determined, at the least, the timing of the national holiday. As with Wicker’s suggestion that 
Britain’s departure from gold in September 1931 had repercussions for American banks, the 
external drain in 1933 created problems for eastern banks similar to those faced earlier by 
banks in the interior experiencing a drain to the eastern financial centers. 
 
5. Regional Aspects of the Conflict Over Monetary Policy 
 
As is well known, there was a divide, partly along regional lines, within the Federal 
Reserve between those who favored aggressive open market operations and those who 
thought that large-scale open market purchases would be futile or counterproductive. The 
former group included, at times, the governor of the influential Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, and the latter included most of the governors of the other district banks, 
including the governor of the influential Chicago bank. It is natural, therefore, to ask 
whether the interregional balance of payments problems discussed above played a role in 
undermining support for open market purchases. 
The opposition to open market operations undoubtedly reflected psychological 
predispositions and political infighting. As Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 415) astutely 
noted: “The other Banks [other than New York] were much more parochial in both situation 





more concerned with their immediate regional problems, and hence more likely to believe 
that the Reserve System must adjust to other forces than that it could or should take the 
lead.” And as Friedman and Schwartz also noted, regional banks could assert their 
independence by opposing the policies advocated by the New York Federal Reserve.  
But the governors did have to provide an intellectual justification of some sort for 
the positions they took and they were influenced in some measure by ideas. One episode 
discussed at length by Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 370-74) is particularly revealing.  In 
July 1930, George L. Harrison, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, wrote 
to the governors of the other district Banks asking for support for a policy of open market 
purchases.
23 The reason he needed their support is simply that the power to make decisions 
regarding open market operations had recently been placed in the hands of the Open Market 
Policy Committee, which consisted of the 12 Governors of the Federal Reserve Banks. The 
Committee had held its first meeting in May 1930. Harrison, in other words, had to persuade 
a majority of his fellow governors to support a policy of buying government bonds in the 
open market, if the United States was to follow an expansionary open market policy. 
Only two governors supported open market purchases: the Governors of the 
Richmond and Atlanta Banks. Those happen to be the two districts that had witnessed the 
largest decreases in deposits, so to this limited extent there is some support for the notion 
that opposition or support was based on the district level experience. (Figure 3 shows the 
picture of the districts shortly before Harrison called on the other governors for support.) But 
the list of opponents of open market purchases also included Governors in districts that had 
already begun to experience a loss of deposits, including Chicago, the second largest Bank 





with what might be characterized as versions of the real bills doctrine: the idea that 
monetary policy should simply accommodate to the needs of trade. This doctrine, always 
congenial to bankers, had to some extent been institutionalized at the Federal Reserve 
Board, as Allan H. Meltzer has shown, in a relatively sophisticated version that Meltzer 
dubbed the Burgess-Riefler doctrine. (Wheelock 1998; Meltzer, 2002). The views of some 
of the Governors, however, seemed to reflect relatively primitive versions of the doctrine: 
(1) that low levels of nominal interest rates were proof that credit was already abundant, or 
simply (2) that open market operations intended to buoy the economy were attempts at 
tampering with supply and demand.
24 
Several of the governors expressed concerns that open market operations at that time 
would reignite speculation. Frederic H. Curtiss, the chairman of the Boston Bank “expressed 
strong opposition to further purchases on the grounds that they were likely to feed the stock 
market rather than the bond market” (as summarized by Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, 
373). James McDougal, Governor of the Chicago Bank, the second largest in the system, 
warned that if open market purchases were made “speculation might easily arise in some 
other direction” (as quoted by Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, 371). And Lynn P. Talley of 
the Dallas bank seemed to refer with some bitterness to the failure of the Federal Reserve to 
stop speculation in 1929. Fear of reigniting speculation may seem fanciful in retrospect. The 
stock market (measured by the Dow Jones average) was then about 70 percent below its 
peak, and was about back to where was in 1924. Nevertheless, it is clear, if we are willing to 
take these Governors at face value, that this is what they believed. (Calomiris and 





As the contraction worsened, and as deposits in all regions began to shrink, support 
for open market operations grew among the governors, but McDougal of Chicago remained 
a persistent opponent. In one famous episode in 1932 he refused to allow the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago to join in open market purchases. Since the New York Federal 
Reserve might then have run short of gold, McDougal's intransigence undermined the effort 
to continue open market operations begun in 1932. (Eichengreen 1992, pp. 30-31) 
  The fear of reigniting speculation may have been based simply on a general feeling 
that speculation was bad, and had produced the downturn. But it is possible that the fear of 
speculation was based on an understanding, perhaps intuitive, that a boom on Wall Street 
would attract funds from the interior, as had happened in 1928 and 1929, further weakening 
banks in the interior. One is then led to ask whether the Governors would have been more 
receptive to another policy, say cuts in required reserve ratios, that was less biased toward 
New York and Wall Street? Given their general conservatism, and their reliance on interest 
rates as the ultimate test of the ease or tightness of monetary policy, it seems unlikely. 
Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that open market purchases, which were perceived as 
attracting money from the interior into New York, may have faced more difficulties in 
winning support than a policy that promised a more even geographical distribution of the 
benefits. 
    
6. The Banking Crises of the Early 1930s from a Regional Perspective 
  The banking crises of the early 1930s seem to have much in common with the twin 
crises of recent years.  In 1929-1930 the United States experienced a sharp cyclical decline 





in the real prices of foods, fibers, and minerals. There was, moreover, a silent run on the 
interior banks, as corporations and banks moved funds to the eastern financial centers for 
precautionary purposes, and as institutions and individuals purchased non-bank assets held 
in the east. Banks in the rural regions therefore came under intense pressure. A number of 
failures, some of them large, occurred, but since the failures were concentrated among the 
banks that had taken undue risks in the twenties, their regional locus was somewhat 
idiosyncratic. Eventually, silent runs were joined by noisy runs as individual depositors, 
alarmed by the growing tide of bank closures, and by the continual decline in economic 
activity, began converting deposits into cash, producing a catastrophic contraction in the 
number of banks, and in the supply of money and credit. The final denouement was 
produced by a rash of bank holidays declared by local and state governments that restricted 
the convertibility of deposits into cash. 
  The absence of nationwide branch banking has been pointed to as an important 
structural weakness that lay behind the banking crisis (White, 1984). The analysis presented 
here strengthens that conclusion. If the banks in the interior had been branches of major 
banks with home offices in the eastern financial centers the story might have been very 
different. Lending might have been curtailed in the interior and branches closed, as in 
Canada.
25 (Bordo, Rockoff, Redish, 1994). But there would have been no incentive for 
corporations to move working balances from the interior to the financial centers. In 
developing this argument it is important to distinguish between intraregional branching and 
interregional branching. The problem for the interior banks was not so much that they were 
small banks, although that didn't help, but rather that they were separated from the banks in 





tried to protect themselves by moving funds outside the affected regions. Partly, the decision 
to move funds must have been based on the assumption that banks in the financial centers 
held safer, better diversified portfolios of assets. But the decision may also have been based 
simply on the assumption that banks in the financial centers were more sophisticated about 
financial matters, and therefore better able to cope with uncertain times. The banking 
situation, to put it somewhat differently, would not have been very different even if their had 
been widespread intraregional branching, only interregional branching would do. Even a 
large bank with branches throughout the wheat-growing region of the Middle West, for 
example, might have fallen under a cloud and been subject to runs in the early 1930s when 
the real price of wheat was falling 60 percent. Only a bank with branches in both the Middle 
West and the eastern financial centers could hope to whether the storm.  
It is always possible, one must admit, that if interregional branching had been 
widespread things might have gone wrong in another way. Recent evidence (Carlson 2001), 
suggests that in the 1930s banks with branches were more likely to fail rather than less 
likely, because the banks with branches had assumed more risk than banks without 
branches. There was no banking across state lines in the 1930s, but Carlson’s data does 
include California, where banks could branch across different economic regions. So it is 
possible that had cross state branching been permitted, banks would have assumed riskier 
postures in the 1920s, and concern about bad loans in the interior in the early 1930s might 
have undermined confidence in and led to the closure of some very large banks. We can’t be 
sure. But the collapse of the system might have been avoided had interregional branch 





different path from the one actually followed, and might have generated a more appropriate 
policy response. 
  The regional nature of the crisis, especially during the early going, may have 
contributed to the failure of the Federal Reserve to respond effectively to the crisis. The one 
plan then seriously under consideration that might have alleviated the pressure on the 
banking system was the proposal by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that the Federal 
Reserve System buy bonds on the open market. The Governors of the other district Banks, 
however, vetoed large-scale open market operations. Their opposition stemmed from a 
variety of factors, including their reliance on a version (in some cases a rather crude version) 
of the real bills doctrine. From their viewpoint, moreover, open market purchases may have 
appeared to be a region-specific medicine, likely to reignite speculation on the stock market, 
but unlikely to pay real dividends elsewhere. While we can fault the Federal Reserve for 
failing to engage in open market operations in response to the general contraction of income, 
it would be unreasonable to criticize it for failing to see the warning signs in the 
interregional gold flows. The Federal Reserve was a young institution and these were 
unprecedented gold movements. Nevertheless, it is interesting to recognize that had these 
been international rather than interregional flows, they would have excited considerable 
interest. 
  There was a time when it would have appeared foolish to worry about the recurrence 
of a crisis caused by a combination of depression, deflation, and a balkanized banking 
system. In recent years, however, deflation -- already a fact of life in Japan -- has loomed on 
the horizon for the United States and the European Monetary Union. And while the banking 





branching, the European Monetary Union is still far from having a unified banking system. 
The present analysis then, may serve as a cautionary tale showing how a banking-balance-
of-payments crisis can develop with great rapidity and virulence within what seems on the 







































100  100  100  100  100  100 
1926 
 
89  74  105  93  88  110 
1927 
 
84  77  124  114  87  100 
1928 
 
80  86  122  139  90  95 
1929 
 
72  82  114  134  92  104 
1930 
 
57  61  91  115  67  88 
1931 
 
44  44  55  96  59  65 
1932 
 
40  37  63  90  40  57 
 
Note: the NNP deflator was used to deflate all prices and farm and mineral incomes. 
 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975): series E123 (wheat), E126 (cotton), K504 (corn), 































Mountain  Pacific 
1925  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1926  96  97  100  105  96  94  102  102  105 
1927  98  97  105  106  101  99  89  102  96 
1928  99  94  105  112  101  102  89  104  90 
1929  98  95  110  109  96  98  87  107  91 
1930  99  94  117  106  102  97  81  95  91 
1931  103  96  136  98  103  93  61  82  78 
1932  95  99  148  86  125  86  73  74  86 
1933  105  103  136  84  115  94  65  79  86 
 
Note. The regions are defined as follows. New England:  Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Middle Atlantic:  New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. 
East North Central: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. West North Central:  Minnesota, Iowa, 
Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. South Atlantic:  Delaware, Maryland, Dist. Of 
Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. East South Central:  
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. West South Central:  Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and 
Texas. Mountain:  Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada. Pacific:  
Washington, Oregon, and California.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

























New England  6.00%  6.94%  -48.76% 
Middle Atlantic  5.67  8.31  -55.61 
East North Central  25.17  21.76  -73.33 
West North Central  16.97  -26.72  -70.37 
South Atlantic  20.91  17.98  -44.97 
East South Central  19.89  -4.04  -63.34 
West South Central  17.04  -29.78  -61.33 
Mountain  11.65  -30.01  -60.21 
Pacific  4.87  -5.46  -54.69 
Correlation    0.15  -0.50 
Notes: See table 2 for the regions 
Sources: Suspended Deposits: U. S. Board of Governors (1943, pp. 25-33, 285). Export 









Table 3      State and Local Bank Holidays in 1932-33 
 
Date  State  Action Taken 
17 October 1932  Minnesota  Municipal holidays declared 
1 November   Nevada  12 day moratorium; twice renewed 
January 1933  Illinois 
Iowa  
Small towns declare local holidays 
20 January  Iowa  One-day Holiday 
4 February  Louisiana  One-day holiday 
14 February   Michigan  8-day holiday, renewed until 
federal holiday 
20 February   New Jersey 
 
Legislature authorizes banking 
commission to declare a 
moratorium on February 21 this 
power is exercised for one bank  
  Missouri  One bank restricts withdrawals 
after mayor declares moratorium 
23 February  New Jersey  Limited withdrawals authorized at 
two banks 
25 February   Maryland  3-day holiday, subsequently 
extended 
  Ohio  Banks self-declare holidays 
  Missouri  Banks granted right to restrict 
withdrawals 




Banks restrict withdrawals under 
the authority of new banking laws 
28 February                                        Arkansas, 
Pennsylvania 
Banks initiate restrictions  
1 March  
 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh  Individual banks self-declare 
holidays 




2 March   Alabama, California, 
Georgia Louisiana Mississippi 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Texas,   














4 March   Colorado, Delaware 














Virtually all remaining banks closed 
by governor's proclamations at the 
request of Treasury officials.  
6 March   United States  Bank Holiday 
Sources: Commercial and Financial Chronicle, the New York Times, and Kennedy (1973), passim.  
The list is probably not complete, but it is probably sufficient for a broad brush picture of the extent and 










Table 4   State Bank Restrictions, Sunday, March 5, 1933 
 
State  Description of Restrictions  
Alabama  Closed until further notice 
Arizona  Closed until March 13 
Arkansas  Closed until March 7 
California  Almost all closed until March 9 
Colorado  Closed until March 8 
Connecticut  Closed until March 7 
Delaware  Closed indefinitely 
District of Columbia  Three banks limited to 5%; nine savings banks invoke sixty days' notice 
Florida  Withdrawals restricted to 5% plus $10 until March 8 
Georgia  Mostly closed until March 7, closing optional 
Idaho  Some closed until March 18, closing optional 
Illinois   Closed until March 8, then to be opened on 5% restriction basis for seven 
days 
Indiana  About half restricted to 5% indefinitely 
Iowa  Closed "temporarily" 
Kansas  Restricted to 5% withdrawals indefinitely 
Kentucky  Mostly restricted to 5% withdrawals until March 11 
Louisiana  Closing mandatory until March 7 
Maine  Closed until March 7 
Maryland  Closed until March 6 
Massachusetts  Closed until March 7 
Michigan  Mostly closed, others restricted to 5% indefinitely; Upper peninsula banks 
open  
Minnesota  Closed "temporarily" 
Mississippi  Restricted to 5% indefinitely 
Missouri  Closed until March 7 
Montana  Closed until further notice 





Nevada  Closed until March 8, also schools 
New Hampshire  Closed subject to further proclamation 
New Jersey  Closed until March 7 
New Mexico  Mostly closed until March 8 
New York  Closed until March 7 
North Carolina  Some banks restricted to 5% withdrawals 
North Dakota  Closed temporarily 
Ohio  Mostly restricted to 5% withdrawals indefinitely 
Oklahoma  All closed until March 8 
Oregon  All closed until March 7 
Pennsylvania  Mostly closed until March 7, Pittsburgh banks open 
Rhode Island  Closed yesterday 
South Carolina  Some closed, some restricted, all on own initiative 
South Dakota  Closed indefinitely 
Tennessee  A few closed, others restricted, until March 9 
Texas  Mostly closed, others restricted to withdrawals of $15 daily until March 8 
Utah  Mostly closed until March 8 
Vermont  Closed until March 7 
Virginia  All closed until March 8 
Washington  Some closed until March 7 
West Virginia   Restricted to 5% monthly withdrawals indefinitely 
Wisconsin  Closed until March 17 
Wyoming  Withdrawals restricted to 5% indefinitely 
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1. This paper was prepared for the Conference on the Anatomy of Deflations organized by Richard 
Burdekin and Pierre Siklos in conjunction with the International Economic History Association 
Meetings in Buenos Aires in 2002. Michael Bordo, Richard Burdekin, Kerry Odell, Pierre Siklos, 
Anna J. Schwartz, and Eugene White graciously provided comments on a previous draft. They are 
not to blame for the mistakes that remain. 
 
2. There is a large literature on the “twin crises.” Some papers that started me thinking about the 
analogy between the regional crises in the U.S. in the 1930s and more recent crises were Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1998), Miller (1998), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
 
3. Scholars addressing real as opposed to monetary aspects of the depression, however, have 
frequently adopted a regional perspective: Wallis (1987), Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997), and 
Heim (1998).  
 
4. The data are from Friedman and Schwartz (1983, p. 124)  
  
5. Bank failure rates were high in rural regions in the 1920s, partly as a result of agricultural 
distress: (Wheelock, 1992; Alston, Grove, and Wheelock, 1994).  
 
6. Roosevelt’s Silver Purchase Program reversed the plunge in silver prices. This Program, which 
began in December 1933, and was accelerated under the Silver Purchase Act of June 1934, was 
intended to raise the price of silver, a boon to western silver producing states, and to increase the 
stock of money, through Treasury purchases of silver. As a result, the price of silver rose to a 
temporary peak of $.64 per fine oz. in 1935. The price then slumped once more, although it 
remained above the depths of 1930-32 in both nominal and real terms. It has been claimed that the 
purchase program had a deleterious effect on China. (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, 483-490; 
Brandt and Sargent, 1989; Friedman 1992;  Rawski 1993). 
7. Paul Rhode brought this data to my attention.  
 
8. Calomiris and Mason (2000, 24), using their rich microeconomic data set, found mixed results 
from their agricultural variables. For example, monthly agricultural price change was significant in 
some, but not all regressions explaining bank survival rates. A greater presence of small farms had a 
negative effect on bank survival, but in their words the effect was not “highly significant or robust.” 
 
9. The deposit currency ratio is also, of course, a determinant of the stock of money, which 
Friedman and Schwartz consider the key variable.  
 
10.  We see some large private flows in the 1920-21 recession, if we extend the figure back to the 
early 1920s. These flows, however, appear to be a winding down of flows produced by the war. The 





                                                                                                                                                             
existing stock than in the early 1930s. The form of the accounts was changed, however, in 1926. 
And, I have not found a discussion of the pre-1926 accounts as thorough and authoritative as 
Hartland’s (1949) discussion of the post-1926 accounts. So my reading of the early accounts is 
tentative.  
 
11. Gold mining was an exception to the general trend in mining because the government fixed the 
nominal price. Thus, the real price of gold rose while the real price of other minerals fell. 
12. The Settlement Fund accounts don't distinguish among the sources of additional gold. It is 
known that latter on the Federal Reserve changed participations regularly to maintain district gold 
balances.  
 
13. This point was noted by Fels (1950), and Hartland (1950). 
 
14. Trade weighted terms of trade by census region were computed by Waite (1942). I calculated 
the terms of trade for the Eastern Financial districts by weighting his indexes for New England and 
the Middle Atlantic states by their shares in regional personal income. I haven’t found the 
explanation for the sharp drop in the terms of trade in 1932. 
 
15. The per capita income figures by state are widely available. I created federal district estimates 
simply by adding the personal incomes of each state in the district. Where only a part of a state was 
included in a district I simply made a guess as to the fraction of the state’s economic activity that 
occurred in a particular district. Overall the estimates do not appear sensitive to these guesses.  
 
16. A chart of reserve growth is similar. 
 
17. More precisely, the first 10 months of the contraction. The NBER business cycle peak occurs in 
August 1929.  
 
18. I examined the state level data that underlies Bodenhorn's regional estimates, but failed to turn 
up obvious increases due to banking panics or liquidity shortages. I am grateful to Professor 
Bodenhorn for sharing his state-level estimate. 
 
 
19. The nominal rates are from Smiley (1981, 897). The wheat rate of interest was computed by 
subtracting the percentage change in the price of a bushel of wheat (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1975, 511, series K508) between 1928 and 1929 from the 1929 nominal loan rate, and the 
percentage change between 1929 and 1930 from the 1930 nominal loan rate.  
20. Similar restrictions were adopted in Argentina in December 2001 during its financial crisis.  
 
21. The holiday was declared in order to give the state’s largest bank time to apply for a 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Loan, a consideration that was also behind some of the other 
holidays. The pressure on the bank determined the date; the occasion was found afterwards, the 
anniversary of the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany prior to World War I! (Chandler 
1970, 120).  
 





                                                                                                                                                             
23. This section is based on Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 370-4).  
 
24. The failure to distinguish between nominal and real rates was stressed by Brunner and Meltzer 
(1968). 
  
25. The success of the Canadian banking system in avoiding a U.S. style collapse does not mean 
that Canada avoided the Great Contraction. Industrial production in Canada followed the same 
downhill path as in the United States. 